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Miller: Some Problems in Venue and Jurisdiction
SOME PROBLEMS IN VENUE AND JURISDICTION
LEwIS H. MILLE 0

O RDINARILY the question of venue in civil cases is a simple
one and but few problems arise not promptly met and decided
in a very great majority of the reported cases. Statutory pro.
visions, either declaratory of the common law or prescribing place
of suit in specific instances, have cleared the field of uncertainty
and doubt but unusual situations often arise after venue has been
quite properly laid and all defendants legally before the court.
With these matters this article will undertake to deal in the
hope that a few suggestions may be of benefit to the bench and
bar of this state.
Chapter 56, article 1, section 1 of the West Virginia Code,
dealing with the subject of venue in general provides:
"Any action or other proceeding at law or suit in equity,
except where it is otherwise specially provided, may hereafter
be brought in the circuit court of any county:
"(a) Wherein any of the defendants may reside, except
that an action of ejeetment or unlawful detainer must be
brought in the county wherein the land sought to be recovered,
or some part thereof, is... "
Section 2 of the same article provides:
"Any action, suit or proceeding may be brought in any
county wherein the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose,
although none of the defendants reside therein, in the following
instances:
"(a) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant,
one or more of the defendants, is a corporation;
"(b) W-ben the defendant, or if more than one defendant,
one or more of the defendants, are served in such county
with process or notice conunencing such action, suit or proceeding."
It will be observed that by virtue of either section, depending upon the facts, one or more defendants to the action or suit
may be sued in any county if service of process is had upon at
at least one of them in the county where suit is brought, ignoiing
for the present the instances wherein a corporation is sued with
a natural person Fid jurisdiction acquired over all other defendants in that manner Assuming for the purposes of this discussion that all defendants are properly before the court, either
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under section 1 or 2 and have been served with process in different
counties, how may the trial court lose jurisdiction on account
of situations arising after the institution of the suit or during
the trial thereof?
It is submitted that four several conditions may arise depriving the court of jurisdiction: (a) failure to prove liability against
the resident defendant, (b) death of the resident defendant prior
to trial, (c) marriage of the plaintiff with the resident defendant, or (d) compromise between the plaintiff and the resident defendant with a dismissal of the suit as to him before trial. In
each instance the resident defendant will be considered the party
upon whom process was served in the county of suit.
The experience generally encountered is failure to show liability against the resident defendant. Such a status very often
arises in actions ex delicto involving claims for personal injury
and property damage coupled with the ambitions of the plaintiff
to have the case tried in the county of his residence. In some
instances persons temporarily in a county other than their residence, not the county where the cause of action arose, have been
served with process and through such service other defendants
residing in different counties brought into such county to answer
suit. In one case' the trial court was prohibited from further
procedure when it appeared that the plaintiff had no claim against
the defendant served with process in the county where suit was
brought. The result of the case hinged entirely upon the liability of the defendant served in the county of suit, and plaintiff failing in this effort the entire case was abated as to all
the defendants without regard to their possible or probable liability to the plaintiff.
In a later action,2 in which one of the defendants was a corporation, the natural defendant being a resident of a county
other than that of suit and served in the county of his residene-e,
the proposition was raised that jurisdiction to try the action should
not depend upon the actual liability of the defendant through
whom jurisdiction over all the defendants was acquired but upon
the good faith of the plaintiff in joining such defendant as a
party to the action. Although recognizing a respectable line of
IWolfe v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325 (1933).
2 Gunnoe v. West Virginia Poultry Co-Op. Ass 'n, 115 W. Va. 87, 174 S. E.
691, 93 A. L. R. 944 (1934).
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authority supporting this view the court in passing upon the contention said:
"The question is urged that inasmuch as the plaintiff acted
in good faith in joining the West Virginia Poultry Co-Operative Association, and inasmuch as it had reasonable grounds
to believe that liability existed on its part, that its joinder is
proper and gives venue as to Erdlen, even though no cause of
action may exist as against the corporation. There is substantial authority to this effect. At the same time, we are
of the opinion that the more distinct and better rule, and that
probably having the weight of authority behind it, is to the
effect that venue depends upon the actual existence of the
cause of action, and not upon the mere bona fides of the plaintiff in making his selection of defendants. We believe that
making the matter of venue depend upon the good faith of
the plaintiff based upon a reasonable belief in liability, although we recognize the plausibility of a great deal that can
be said in favor of it, would involve the question in uncertainties and speculations that are highly undesirable in dealing
with a question so fundamental."
It is now well established that a failure to prove liability
against the resident defendant, or against a corporation when
jurisdiction over all defendants arises out of service upon it, will
result in an abatement of the entire action, provided the nonresident defendants raise the issue by timely plea in abatement.
II
The second problem relates to the effect of the death of the
resident defendant pendente lite upon the status of the other
defendants. Chapter 56, article 8, section 2, among other things
provides:
if it occur as to any of several plaintiffs or
defendants, the suit or action may proceed for or against the
others, if the cause of suit or action survive to or against
them."
In construing this section it has been held that it merely
prevents a total abatement in case of the death of a coplaintiff
or codefendant and has nothing to do with reviving a suit for
or against a personal representative.3 The quoted portion is a
flat declaration that the death of a party either plaintiff or defendant joined with others does not produce an abatement of
the suit. It must be conceded that the general terms of the stat3 Henning v. Farnsworth, 41 W. Va. 548, 23 S. E. 663 (1895).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1943

3

WEST
VIRGINIA
LAWVol.
QUARTERLY
West Virginia
Law Review,
49, Iss. 2 [1943], Art. 3
ute would operate upon a situation where several defendants are
before the court by virtue of service upon one of them in the county
of suit and upon the others wherever found. There is no exception favoring that class of cases. If the action could not survive
as to the remaining defendants then the result would be entirely
different but it must be borne in mind that as a general rule
actions do not abate on account of the death of one of several
4
joint defendants.
There is another principle, often operating with great force,
that jurisdiction properly acquired is retained no matter what
subsequent events may transpire. This rule is almost universal
and is not varied unless the plaintiff works a forfeiture resulting in an abatement of the action. But where the change in parties
or the subsequent event is beyond the control of the plaintiff the
suit or action should not abate and this certainly comprehends
a situation where one of the defendants dies though he be the
party through whom venue as to the others was laid in a certain
place or county. It would seem that nothing short of a statute abating a suit under this condition will defeat the right of
a plaintiff to proceed against the surviving defendants. In West
Virginia there is no such statute and in its absence jurisdiction
onc.e acquired will be exercised until the power of the court has
ceased under the law.
This view may work some few hardships upon defendants in
tort actions, or in other eases where the rile applies, and prevent
them from defending suits in the county of their residence but
any other conclusion would work a greater hardship upon a plaintiff and deprive him of the benefit the law affords pertaining to
venue. The rights of parties to a legal controversy should not
depend upon uncertain shifting from place to place unless brought
about by the conduct of the party in whose favor the right exists.
Assuming the death of the resident defendant pendente lite
and further assuming that no liability attached to his conduct,
as developed at the trial, what effect is produced as to the liability of the remaining defendants? Jurisdiction over all defendants is conceded unless the question is raised by proper plea.
All the cases disclose that unless the nonresident defendants promptly and properly raise the question of lack of liability upon the
part of the resident defendant they submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Where a court has general jurisdiction
41 AU, JVR. Abatement and Revival § 62,
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over subject matter the unrestricted appearance of defendants
amounts to a waiver of all rights to raise jurisdictional issues.
This jurisdiction over all the defendants carries with it the
power and right to decide liability of any of them no matter what
the result of the trial might have been as to the resident defendant. His death before trial should not operate to control the
result as to the others even though the evidence discloses he was
entirely without fault. There was a proper time when this matter could have been determined but in the absence of a plea in
abatement and a trial of the issues arising thereon prior to a
determination of the merits of the case this phase becomes a closed
book.
If a plea in abatement is filed within time and the resident
defendant dies prior to trial it is submitted that his death should
not deprive the remaining defendants from showing lack of liability on his part and thus defeat the right of the plaintiff to
proceed to trial upon the merits of the case. But again the
abatement arises not out of the death of this particular defendant
but because of no liability on his part properly presented as a
timely issue.
III
A very interesting situation may easily develop from the
marriage of the plaintiff with the resident defendant after the
institution of the suit but before trial. In a well considered case'
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia said:
"An action at law by a husband against his wife for
damages for personal injuries is against the policy of the law
of this state and cannot be maintained, though sustainable
under the law of the state where the injuries were received."
Thus we have the established law of the state as a matter
of policy when the parties to the suit are married at the time
of the happening of the event giving rise thereto. The rule is
carried to the extent of denying relief even though remediable
in the state where the cause of action arose. It will be observed
that the case is authority only where a personal injury is involved.
What effect does the marriage of a plaintiff with a resident
defendant have upon the rights of the nonresident defendants
when such marriage was consummated after suit but prior to
trial? In the first place there is no reason why a marriage should
5 Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935).
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not operate to destroy any right of action either of the parties
might have against the other for a tort. The common law exeluded the right of a wife to sue her husband for a tort committed
by him against her before the marriage and there is no statute
in West Virginia enlarging her right in this respect. This situation effectively bars her right to join her husband in a suit with
other defendants or to sue him alone because there is no right of
action which she may assert against him. And due to the question of policy there is no reason why the husband is not also
barred from maintaining a suit against the wife for personal injury.
Suppose jurisdiction to try the case in a certain county depends upon the liability of the resident defendant and during
the pendency of the suit the plaintiff and resident defendant
intermarry does this abate the suit as to the remaining defendants? The answer may depend upon the steps taken by the
other defendants to preserve all their rights. Probably this defense could not be made upon the merits of the case but must be
specially pleaded by the objecting' defendants. It would not
amount to a strict plea in abatement but one going to the very
right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit in his or her present
capacity. A plea of a similar nature was employed in the case
of Kuzns v. Fair6 and treated as a plea in bar although partaking
of the nature of a plea in abatement. As' a basic policy of procedure no special plea should be required but the result made
to hinge upon the destruction of the right of action against the
resident defendant on account of the marriage. When this right
is destroyed there is nothing left between these two parties to
be tried in court. Under such a condition the jurisdiction of the
court extends beyond the parties and becomes one of subject matter-the right to deal with the controversy itself. But no matter
what method is employed to present the issue the very fact of
the marriage should work a complete abatement of the suit. This
result is the consequence of the acts of the plaintiff and in strict
keeping with the broad policy announced in the case of Poling V.
Poling. It is a natural incident from the conduct of the plaintiff and not a termination beyond his or her control.
As a matter 'of practice it is much better to file a special
plea akin to a plea of puis darrein continuance bringing the
fact of marriage to the attention of the court. The effect of such
6 22 S. E. (2d) 455 (W. Va. 1942).
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plea is to abate the suit on account of facts arising after the
time within which a plea in abatement may be filed.
IV
Another problem which may be encountered is a compromise
between the plaintiff and resident defendant before trial. In the
ordinary case a dismissal of one defendant from the suit at the
instance of the plaintiff does not work an abatement of the suit.
But, assuming the remaining defendants properly raise the issue
by a proper plea, should the court retain jurisdiction over the
suit and try it as to the other defendants? It seems impossible
to argue in favor of such a course. Again, as in the case of
marriage, the plaintiff is the moving factor and the dismissal of
the resident defendant from the suit is at the instance of the
plaintiff. He used this defendant to bring others into court; he
destroyed all further action as to him by the compromise and it
seems the whole cause perished when the prop that supported it
fell by the wayside. If this procedure is permitted a plaintiff
can easily defeat the requirement of actual liability on the part
of the resident defendant and join him for the sole purpose of
bringing other parties into a strange county for trial. Such
improper use of a venue statute should not prevail.
There are probably cases where a compromise of this nature
is made in good faith with complete satisfaction to the parties
involved but the tendency to fraud outweighs the few instances
of fair dealing. In the end the consideration of such an important matter is not based upon the probable benefits a plaintiff or defendant may enjoy but upon the question of public policy
underlying a principle of law. Is it sound policy to permit a
plaintiff to control the rights of citizens of the state to the
extent of compelling them to go into distant counties through
the use of another with whom he composes his differences and
still insist upon a trial of the others? If sp nonresident defendants would be subjected to hazards and injustices, if not collusion, between a plaintiff and designing resident defendant. The right
to defend a cause in the county of one's residence should not be
taken away without reasonable compliance with the law.
No case has been found in this state deciding this particular
issue but following some well established principles to a natural
conclusion it should be held as a matter of law that a plaintiff
under the circumstances set forth loses all the benefits of his
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suit when he effects a compromise with the party through whom
other defendants were brought into court. In other words the
entire suit should immediately abate and the remaining defendants discharged from that forum. If the plaintiff desires to sue
again he has that right and may do so in any county he is able
to find one of them.
V
As a sequence to the discussion above some attention might
be given to the necessary steps to be employed by the.nonresident defendants in order to preserve all their rights. Of course
the answer to particular problems depends upon the facts. If
the nonresident defendants wish to contest the existence of liability on the part of the resident defendant, as in the case of
7
Wolfe v. Shau),
they should appear and file within due time a plea
in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court. Under the statutes
the issue on such plea is tried first and if found against the
defendant other defenses may be made. If the parties go to trial
on the merits of the case, although a plea. in abatement is timely
filed, all benefit of the plea is lost and jurisdiction over the defendants admitted., In the case of Wolfe v. Shaw resort was had to
a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial from entertaining the
action but the record discloses a plea in abatement was first.
filed and a trial had thereon resulting in an adverse decision to
the defendants supporting it. The Supreme Court of A~ipeals
did not hold that a writ of prohibition might be used as a substitute for a plea in abatement but did hold that upon the trial of
the issue arising upon such plea it clearly appeared that the
plaintiff had no cause of action against the resident defendant.
Quoting from a former opinion 0 the court said:
"Whenever it appears that a court is proceeding in a
cause without jurisdiction, prohibition will issue, regardless
of the existence of other remedies."
Since jurisdiction in these cases goes to the person rather
than the cause of action it may be waived and will be unless the
defect is pleaded in abatement. It is not such a jurisdictional question that may be raised for the first time upon a writ of error
in the appellate court.
7 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325 (1933).
8 NV. 11A. CODE ANN (Michie, 1937) e. 56, art. 4, § 38.
9 Robinson v. Engle, 107 W. Va. 589, 149 S. E. 836 (1929).
10 Midland Investment Corp. v. Ballardl 101 W. Va. 591, 133 S. E. 316 (1926).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol49/iss2/3

8

Miller: Some Problems in Venue and Jurisdiction
120

PROBLEMS IN VENUE AND JURISDICTION

What course should the nonresident defendants take in case
the plaintiff marries the resident defendant or effects a compromise
of the case with him? These are matters that arise during the
progress of the suit, probably after the time expires within which
a plea in abatement can be filed. Two reasonable views might be
taken of these situations: (1) the conduct of the plaintiff destroys the right to proceed to trial becase the court has no author-

ity to hear the controversy, or (2) the jurisdiction once acquired
will be retained unless the defendants specially plead some new
matter defeating it.
If the first view is adopted no special plea is necessary and
the fact of the compromise or marriage might be shown under
the general issue. If marriage or compromise destroys the very
right to try the cause the defect is one of subject matter and not
jurisdiction over the person. There is logic in this position but
practical considerations might result in its rejection.
The second view is more consistent with the adopted practice
in this state in that special defense must be specially pleaded.
This requirement narrows the issue to a single inquiry and directs
the attention of the court to a fatal defect stripped of all immaterial substance going to the merits of the cause. It is suggested that a plea of puis darrein continuance or similar import
be employed setting up the specific facts relied upon to bring
about an abatement of the suit."
Practically all the cases involving the matters discussed show
an overlapping of principles relating to venue and jurisdiction.
Primarily the basic question is one of venue often confused with
jurisdiction. Why not eliminate any consideration of jurisdiction and treat the whole problem as one of venue? The statute
confers certain rights upon a party about to institute a suit and
gives him the privilege of convening the defendants in any county
where he may serve one of them with process. This privilege is
special and against the general rule that a defendant has the
right to defend a suit in his own county. Hence the statute
should be construed strictly against a plaintiff and favorable
to a defendant. When the plaintiff uses this method of convening the defendants in one county he should be compelled to show
the facts justifying this course. In other words the burden of
showing proper venue should: rest at all times upon the plaintiff
11HOGG, PLEADIDG & FORMS (3d ed. 1908) § 246; Hunt v. Wilkinson, 2
Call. 49 (Va. 1799); Garred v. Henry, 6 Rand. 110 (Va. 1828); Virginian
Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 129 S. E. 700 (1925).
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and the facts should appear upon the trial. In criminal cases
the state must always show this fact-why require less from a
citizen in a civil suit when he acts under a statute conferring
special favors? Venue should extend beyond the mere maturing
of a suit; it should project itself into the actual trial far enough
to require the plaintiff to disclose the facts upon which it is based.
If this were the rule the trial would be simplified and very material matter, whether venue or not, could be presented at one
hearing and upon a general issue. The result of the suit should
be made to depend upon the right to maintain the suit at a particular place and the facts relating thereto could be as easily
disclosed upon the one trial as upon a plea in abatement or one
of a similar nature. Suppose the suit is instituted under section
2, article 1, chapter 56 and the facts at the trial disclose the
cause of action did not arise in the county where suit was brought
must the suit be abated there? Strict construction of the statute certainly would bring about that very result.
If the whole situation could be confined to the realm of venue
less confusion would reign and speedier determination of judi2
cial controversies ensue.'
12 Since the preparation of the foregoing article the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has set at rest some of the questions raised and
discussed above in the case of Staats v. Co-Operative Transit Co., S. E. (W.

Va. 3943), opinion by Judge Rose.
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